Results of fighting for January 27th.
By January 28th the offensive actions of the NAF have stopped on the majority of the front. The offensive with decisive goals continues only in the area of the Debalcevo pocket. Some of us continue to call it a "cauldron", but there's no complete closure of the lid yet, there is only a periodic fire control over the enemy communications, which complicates transferring personnel and materiel between the Debalcevo group and the mainland.
1. In the area of the airport our forces continue to hold the positions in the airport itself, the settlement of Spartak, and on the outskirts of the village of Peski. The junta currently controls the most part of the village. Avdeyevka is also firmly held by them. Significant losses were suffered by our side during the fighting for Avdeyevka over the last week, as far as I know. Overall, the junta managed to hold the line here and phase of developing the success after the junta's defeat in the fighting for the airport has reached its conclusion for us here.
2. Our forces today reported that they captured a part of Mar'inka, but there's no speaking of a complete control yet. The enemy is able to pull reserves from the side of Kurakhovo, plus the artillery and the MLRS concentrated under Krasnogorovka can both hit Donetsk and support the junta positions in the area of Mar'inka.
3. The enemy continues to accumulate armor in the area of Yelenovka and Dokuchayevsk and performs attacks in the area of Yelenovka. After capturing Yelenovka the junta may strike directly to the north to the Petrovsky district or it may try to launch a wrapping movement to the east through Mospino, with the goal of cutting the communications that lead from Donetsk to the south. For now our forces hold the line here, but the potential threat on this location is growing.
4. Overall, there are no changes in the area of Mariupol, although during the day there were announcements that our forces allegedly finally captured Vinogradnoye. There are no coherent confirmations of this yet. The enemy continues to redeploy the reinforcements to Mariupol from Zaporozhye and Kherson regions. Overall, the false-flag factor continues to act here.
5. The enemy is engaged in an offensive the area of Gorlovka over the last couple of days with the goal of recapturing the lost positions near Krasnyi Partizan and Mayorsk. The NAF here are on the defensive. There's no speaking of capturing Dzerzhinsk at this point. Correspondingly, the interrupted offensive makes it impossible to stop shelling of Gorlovka for now.
6. The Debalcevo pocket is holding over its perimeter for now, the attempts of penetrating the junta's defense on the perimeter had little success overall: insignificant progress on some locations + substantial losses (especially under Nikishino). Overall, the junta build a quite robust defense here over the last few months, which is hard to penetrate head-on. The main push here is coming from the north-east, where the junta is forced to slowly move its positions to Debalcevo, due to which the pocket is gradually changing its shape and the locals say that the NAF already approached the outskirts of Debalcevo. Probably, due to this threat the enemy will try to narrow the front line and to withdraw a part of its forces in the area of the neck in order to keep its hold of Debalcevo, Uglegorsk, and other strongholds in the villages on the perimeter of the pocket.
Nevertheless, due to the factor of the narrowed neck of the Debalcevo pocket, our offensive continues here, but already today there were constant announcements of the junta counter-attacking the earlier captured points akin to Krasnyi Pakhar, from which further offensive was planned with the goal of cutting of the M-103 roadway. Overall, the enemy figured out that the main threat is coming from this location and so it dramatically increased the pressure on the advancing units, launching counter-attacks with the goal of stabilizing the front line in the area of the neck of the Debalcevo pocket. In the coming few days it will become clear if the NAF will be able to physically capture the crucial road of if the AFU will be able to hold on to the settlements that provide control over the M-103 road.
7. Popasnaya is still not captured, so the plans of the offensive through Popasnaya to the very same M-103 roadway or directly to Artyomovsk remain unfulfilled. Both sides already suffered serious losses here, plus our units already ran into the lack of ammunition, the stocks of which are lagging behind the intensity of fighting. Nevertheless, fighting continues in this area. The front is stuck in the area of the Bakhmutka roadway, the AFU here is actually performing attempts of advancing on the 31-st checkpoint and the high point 175.9. Overall, our offensive has run out of steam here. Further, from Slavyanoserbsk to Stanitsa Luganskaya, there are no significant changes.
Generally, the overall NAF offensive, which started after the victory in the battle for the airport and was developing on several directions at once has mostly stopped (except for the Debalcevo pocket) and the enemy is already trying to launch an offensive of its own under Yelenovka, Gorlovka, and in the area of the Bakhmutka roadway. As it was mentioned at the start of the fighting, it is not worth underestimating the enemy and its numerical superiority. If the junta failed miserably in offensive, then by engaging in exhausting defensive fighting, where there's an exchange of personnel and materiel, the junta managed to hold the positions on the majority of the directions of our attacks. Nevertheless, the situation remains difficult for the junta, because the question of Debalcevo remains unsolved and in the case of forming an encirclement all tactical achievements of the junta in defense will be nullified. On the other side, if the junta will be able to stop us here too, then we risk losing the initiative and then it will be the junta's turn to try to perform an offensive operation with decisive goals instead of the bloody clownery that it staged near the airport.
The losses of both sides in the current fighting are quite serious (the losses of both sides exceed the numbers that are officially announced), although the morale of the military remains quite high. After two weeks of fighting some units start to suffer from the lack of ammunition. The enemy is not showing tendencies of the front line disintegration and army decomposition for now. This is something that has to be forced onto the enemy, and the currently available forces are insufficient for this. So for now all attention is focused on the Debalcevo pocket. The result of the fighting for it will determine the final outcome of the NAF offensive that was conducted since mid-January. Meanwhile, it cannot be ruled out that the junta may try to perform a more serious strike with far-reaching goals (the most threatening location is Yelenovka–Dokuchayevsk) besides its current counter-attacks.
Problems with mobilization expectedly continue to haunt Ukraine. Apparently, the 4-th wave of mobilization will be disrupted, but some percentage will be enlisted in the army anyway, so for now they will most likely have to accept whatever they'll have to recruit now, and then there will be a 5-th wave mobilization. Overall, the population – despite the hurrah-patriotic propaganda – isn't super happy to go fight and looks for every opportunity to avoid the need to protect the junta. The means of coercion by which they are trying to force people into the army are only increasing the turmoil among the population, which is gradually getting tired of this war. In addition, the war is starting to have a personal impact on each of them.
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2013389.html (in Russian)